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INTRODUCTION
A common criticism of Federal patent litigation1 is that patent suits are 
tried before lay jurors who are ill-suited to understand the complex 
technologies that many patent suits entail.  Like other juries, patent juries 
are currently drawn from the general population.  Yet many patent suits 
involve cutting-edge technologies — in such areas as computer science, 
electrical engineering, and the life sciences — that are very difficult to 
explain to the average American, who lacks experience in those fields.  
Moreover, patents themselves are written for a person “of skill in the art,” 
which is a hypothetical person who has a significant level of skill and 
experience in the patent’s technological field.  Lay jurors are unlikely to be 
persons of skill in the art, and they may find it utterly impossible to put 
themselves in such a person’s shoes.  The result is that patent suits are tried 
before jurors who often have little ability to even understand the patent and 
the accused product themselves, let alone the ability to accurately compare 
the accused product to the patent claims in order to determine infringement. 
Faced with these difficulties, several commentators have suggested 
that patent cases be tried before specialized juries comprised of individuals 
who have some level of expertise in the field of the patent.2  At the same 
time, these commentators have expressed skepticism about whether it 
would be feasible to impanel such specialized juries.  As one commentator 
stated, “it may be practically impossible to gather a jury of twelve experts 
for each complex, and often lengthy, trial.”3  Similarly, another 
commentator has acknowledged “the potential difficulty of finding highly 
educated specialists who would not suffer undue hardship from being 
compelled to sit through a lengthy patent litigation.”4  Indeed, “[m]ost of 
 1.  Patent lawsuits are litigated solely in the Federal courts.  State courts have no 
jurisdiction to hear such lawsuits.  28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2012). 
 2.  See, e.g., Michael A. Fisher, Going for the Blue Ribbon, 2 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L.
REV. 1, 3 (2001) (considering whether litigants have the right to a jury equipped to 
understand the dispute, and exploring practical ways of selecting expert jurors); Gregory D. 
Leibold, In Juries We Do Not Trust: Appellate Review of Patent-Infringement Litigation, 67 
U. COLO. L. REV. 623, 648-53 (1996) (discussing the legal and practical problems inherent 
in using expert juries); Beth Z. Shaw, Judging Juries: Evaluating Renewed Proposals for 
Specialized Juries from A Public Choice Perspective, 2006 UCLA J. L. & TECH. 3, 6 (2006) 
(suggesting that specialized juries can improve the group deliberation process in patent 
cases); D. Alan White, The Doctrine of Equivalents: Fairness and Uncertainty in an Era of 
Biologic Pharmaceuticals, 60 EMORY L.J. 751, 787 (2011) (exploring the historical roots of 
expert juries and why they could be used in challenging cases). 
 3.  Leibold, supra note 2, at 650. 
 4.  Fisher, supra note 2, at 78; accord Gregory J. Wallace, Toward Certainty and 
Uniformity in Patent Infringement Cases After Festo and Markman: A Proposal for A 
Specialized Patent Trial Court with A Rule of Greater Deference, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 1383, 
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the current proposals acknowledge the potential difficulties in selection and 
retention of specialized juries . . . .”5
This Article seeks to address such skepticism by giving a concrete 
proposal for how to impanel specialized juries for patent cases, and by 
providing empirical survey data suggesting that this proposal would be 
feasible.  Specifically, this Article proposes that the Federal government 
offer one-year jury commissions to technically skilled individuals for an 
annual salary of roughly $100,000.  Qualified individuals would have at 
least a bachelor’s degree in a scientific or technical field, and would be 
assigned to hear patent cases that fall within their area of technical 
expertise for the duration of their one-year term of service.  The cost of 
their salaries would be offset by surcharges on patent litigants, leaving the 
system revenue-neutral from the government’s perspective.  Assuming that 
a specialized juror could hear roughly 18 cases during a one-year term of 
service, and assuming a panel of nine jurors to hear each case, each patent 
litigant would need to pay only $25,000 per lawsuit to fully offset the 
salaries of the specialized jurors.  Given that patent cases typically cost 
millions of dollars to litigate through to verdict, these $25,000 surcharges 
would be comparatively modest, and would seem a small price to pay for 
the benefit of having one’s case heard before skilled jurors who are likely 
to understand the technical issues in the case.  Furthermore, such 
specialized juries would allow patent trials to be streamlined and shortened, 
thus bringing cost savings to litigants that would largely or entirely offset 
the cost of the surcharges. 
To gauge whether technically skilled individuals would be willing to 
serve a one-year term as a specialized patent juror, I surveyed 389 
undergraduate and graduate students at sixteen U.S. colleges and 
universities.6  Each student was either majoring in or pursuing graduate 
work in one of the two broad fields that spawn much complex patent 
litigation: (1) computer science and electrical engineering, or (2) the life 
sciences.7  The survey results were encouraging: out of the 389 total survey 
1409 (2004) (“Another solution might be to require jurors to have a college degree or 
expertise in an area that is relevant to the disputed patent.  It might be impossible, however, 
to obtain enough qualified jurors who meet such a requirement and who would not suffer 
undue hardship from service on a jury throughout the course of a lengthy patent trial.”). 
 5.  Shaw, supra note 2, at 6. 
 6.  These colleges and universities are: Bates College, the University of California-
Berkeley, Claremont McKenna College, Colorado College, the University of Florida, 
Grinnell College, the University of Idaho, the University of Illinois, the University of 
Massachusetts, the University of Mississippi, the University of North Dakota, Penn State 
University, Stanford University, Trinity University (Texas), Wellesley College, and the 
University of Wyoming.  A full description of my survey methodology is provided at 
Appendix A, and a sample survey form is provided at Appendix B.   
 7.  From 1995-2014, five of the eight most common industries for patent litigation 
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respondents, over 73% indicated that they would “seriously consider” a 
one-year, post-graduation term of patent jury service for a salary of 
$100,000 or less.  The results were broadly consistent for undergraduate 
versus graduate students, and for computer science or electrical engineering 
students versus life science students.  These data suggest that there is a 
large pool of skilled individuals who would be willing to serve on the 
specialized patent juries that this Article proposes.  In other words, the data 
suggest that this proposal is a feasible way to impanel specialized juries 
that are competent to hear complex patent cases. 
This Article proceeds in three main Parts.  Part II discusses the 
difficulties that lay juries have in adjudicating complex patent cases and 
explains how specialized juries could greatly improve the adjudicatory 
process.  Part III discusses possible constitutional issues surrounding 
specialized juries, but concludes that specialized juries would be consistent 
with both the Seventh Amendment right to jury trial and the Fourteenth 
Amendment guarantee of equal protection.  Finally, Part IV outlines a 
concrete proposal to staff patent cases with jurors who have a bachelor’s or 
advanced degree in the field of the patent, and who would agree to serve a 
one-year jury term in exchange for a salary of roughly $100,000.  This final 
Part also draws upon survey results to demonstrate the feasibility of this 
proposal, and it provides suggestions for diversifying age and other 
demographics of the proposed specialized patent juries. 
I. THE PROBLEMS WITH LAY PATENT JURIES — AND HOW
SPECIALIZED JURIES COULD ALLEVIATE THESE PROBLEMS
A. The Problems with Lay Patent Juries 
It should come as no surprise that lay jurors often find it difficult to 
decide patent suits, or even to understand the subject-matter of such suits.8
After all, patents may only be granted on “any new and useful process, 
(Biotech/Pharma, Computer Hardware/Electronics, Medical Devices, Software, and 
Telecommunications) were industries that rely heavily on computer science, electrical 
engineering, and/or the life sciences.  See Chris Barry et al., 2015 Patent Litigation Study,
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS 10 (2015), https://www.pwc.com/us/en/forensic-
services/publications/assets/2015-pwc-patent-litigation-study.pdf [https://perma.cc/86FF-
P6Q6] (providing a graph comparing the top ten industries involved in patent cases).  
Moreover, the four industries that yielded the largest patent verdicts (Biotech/Pharma, 
Telecommunications, Medical Devices, and Computer Hardware/Electronics) were all 
industries that rely heavily on computer science, electrical engineering, and/or the life 
sciences. Id. at 11.   
 8.  See Fisher, supra note 2, at 1 (“As patented technologies have become increasingly 
complex, there has been growing concern that ordinary jurors lack the ability to understand 
the scientific and technical issues in patent litigation.”). 
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machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful 
improvement thereof.”9  By definition, therefore, patents are supposed to 
cover new processes, machines, and compositions (i.e., advancements that 
have never been known before).  So, when patents seek to advance such 
technical fields as biotechnology and computer science, the results can be 
dauntingly complex.  Consider, for example, the patent claims10 at issue in 
just the first two decisions issued by the Federal Circuit11 in 2016.  The 
patent claim in the first decision, from the field of biotechnology, reads as 
follows:
A method for making an enzymatic hydrolysate of a soy fiber 
comprising: 
(a) mixing water and a soy fiber to form a substantially 
homogenous aqueous dispersion of hydrated unhydrolyzed 
soy fiber, wherein the unhydrolyzed soy fiber and water are 
present in a weight ratio of between about 1:1.5 and about 
1:8; 
(b) adjusting the pH of the mixture to between about 4.5 and 
about 5.5; 
(c) heating to at least about 200°F for a time sufficient to 
substantially swell the unhydrolyzed soy fiber; 
(d) cooling the mixture to between about 115°F and about 
135°F; 
(e) contacting the mixture with one or more endoglucanase 
enzymes in the absence of exohydrolytic enzymes, said one 
or more endoglucanase enzymes comprising an enzyme 
capable of catalyzing the hydrolysis of 1, 4–â–D–glycosidic 
linkages in cellulose, the one or more endoglucanase 
enzymes being present in a weight ratio to the unhydrolyzed 
soy fiber of about 1:1,000 to about 1:25; 
(f) mixing under high speed for about 60 minutes to about 
120 minutes to hydrolyze between about 0.5% and about 5% 
of the glycosidic bonds present in the unhydrolyzed soy 
fiber;
(g) inactivating the one or more endoglucanase enzymes; 
and
(h) drying the resulting enzymatic hydrolysate by spray 
drying; to provide a hydrolysate of soy fiber having an 
average degree of hydrolysis of between about 0.5% and 
 9.  35 U.S.C. § 101. 
 10.  Patent “claims” are the numbered paragraphs at the end of the patent, each of 
which defines a separate invention that the patent-holder holds exclusive rights to make and 
use.  35 U.S.C. § 112(b).   
 11.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is the Federal court of appeals 
that has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over patent cases.  28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1). 
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about 5%; a water holding capacity which is reduced by 
about 10% to about 35% as compared to the water holding 
capacity of the unhydrolyzed soy fiber; a free simple sugar 
content of less than about 1%; and which is suitable for 
human consumption.12
The patent claim in the second case, from the field of computer 
science, reads as follows: 
A transceiver for transmitting a first stream of data symbols, the 
transceiver comprising: 
a converter for converting the first stream of data symbols 
into plural sets of N data symbols each; 
first computing means for operating on the plural sets of N 
data symbols to produce modulated data symbols 
corresponding to an invertible randomized spreading of the 
first stream of data symbols; and 
means to combine the modulated data symbols for 
transmission.13
The first (biotechnology) claim asks the reader to grapple with an 
eight-step method that includes such technical concepts as enzymatic 
hydrolysate, hydrated unhydrolyzed soy fiber, endoglucanase and 
exohydrolytic enzymes, and 1, 4–â–D–glycosidic linkages.  The second 
(computer science) claim is almost simple by comparison, yet it still asks 
the reader to grapple with “modulated data symbols corresponding to an 
invertible randomized spreading of the first stream of data symbols.”  Both 
claims include concepts that would be virtually impenetrable to readers 
who lack knowledge of life science or computer science, respectively. 
Indeed, patents are designed for people who do have grounding in the 
technological field of the patent.  These people are known as “persons 
skilled in the art,” “persons of ordinary skill in the art,” or simply “skilled 
artisans.”14  Their presence in patent law is nearly ubiquitous.  For example, 
patent claims are preceded by a specification or “written description of the 
invention,” which must contain “such full, clear, concise, and exact terms 
as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains” to make or 
 12.  In re Urbanski, 809 F.3d 1237, 1240 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
 13.  Wi-Lan, Inc. v. Apple, Inc., 811 F.3d 455, 459 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
 14.  This Article will use these terms interchangeably, consistent with the case law.  
See, e.g., In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 990 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (using “person having ordinary 
skill in the art” and “skilled artisan” interchangeably); In re Cortright, 165 F.3d 1353, 1358 
(Fed. Cir. 1999) (using “those skilled in the art” and “one of ordinary skill in the art” 
interchangeably); Janssen Pharm., Inc. v. Watson Labs., Inc., No. CIV.A. 08-5103 SRC, 
2012 WL 3990221, at *1 (D.N.J. Sept. 11, 2012) (“‘skilled artisan’ is shorthand for ‘a 
person of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.’”).
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use the invention.15  Likewise, “[t]he words used in the claims must be 
considered in context and are examined through the viewing glass of a 
person skilled in the art.”16  Moreover, in deciding whether a patent is 
invalid for being a merely obvious advance over prior inventions, the 
proper inquiry is whether “the claimed invention as a whole would have 
been obvious . . . to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the 
claimed invention pertains.”17
Thus, patent jurors are often called upon to place themselves in the 
shoes of a person skilled in the art, and use that vantage point to decide 
various issues in patent cases.  For example, jurors are often instructed that 
any claim terms that were not specifically construed by the court are to be 
given whatever ordinary and accustomed meaning they would have to a 
person of skill in the art.18  Jurors also may be called upon to decide 
whether the patent is invalid for lack of enablement, which turns on 
whether the specification would enable a person of ordinary skill in the art 
to make and use the invention.19  Also, as alluded to above, jurors decide 
whether a patent is invalid for obviousness by asking whether it would 
have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art.20
 15.  35 U.S.C. § 112(a). 
 16.  Ferguson Beauregard/Logic Controls, Div. of Dover Res., Inc. v. Mega Sys., LLC, 
350 F.3d 1327, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 17.  35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012). 
 18.  See, e.g., GPNE Corp. v. Apple Inc., 108 F. Supp. 3d 839, 861 n. 11 (N.D. Cal. 
2015); Internet Machines LLC v. Alienware Corp., No. 6:10-CV-23, 2013 WL 4056282, at 
*13 (E.D. Tex. June 19, 2013) (“the Court instructed the jury that it had interpreted the 
claim language and that any language not interpreted should be given its ordinary meaning 
as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art.”); Saffran v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 2:07-
CV-451 TJW, 2011 WL 1299607, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2011) (“Because the phrase 
was not construed, the jury was charged to give the words their plain and ordinary meaning 
as understood by one with ordinary skill in the art.”) 
 19.  See, e.g., Liquid Dynamics Corp. v. Vaughan Co., 449 F.3d 1209, 1224 (Fed. Cir. 
2006) (“In order to enable the claims of a patent pursuant to § 112, the patent specification 
must teach those of ordinary skill in the art ‘how to make and use the full scope of the 
claimed invention without undue experimentation.’ . . . Here, because the underlying inquiry 
was inherently factual, we look to whether a reasonable jury could have made the 
underlying factual findings necessary to provide substantial evidence in support of its 
[enablement] conclusion.”); Multimedia Patent Trust v. Apple Inc., No. 10-CV-2618-H 
KSC, 2012 WL 6863471, at *7 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2012) (“Summary judgment on the issue 
of enablement is inappropriate because there remains a genuine dispute of material fact for 
the jury as to whether the disclosures of the ’878 Patent teach a person of ordinary skill in 
the art how to decode a non-interlaced field.”).  
 20.  35 U.S.C. § 103.  Technically, obviousness is a mixed question of law and fact, but 
jurors often decide factual questions bearing on obviousness, and these questions are often 
tied to the hypothetical person of skill in the art.  For example, a jury may be asked to 
determine whether a person of skill in the art would have been motivated to modify the prior 
art to create the claimed invention.  See, e.g., Duro-Last, Inc. v. Custom Seal, Inc. 321 F.3d 
1098, 1108-09 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (discussing whether it is obvious to use a butt weld instead 
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The list goes on.  For example, juries may find that an accused product 
infringes a patent under the “doctrine of equivalents.”21  To decide 
doctrine-of-equivalents infringement, a jury must decide whether the 
differences between the accused product and the claim “are ‘insubstantial’ 
to one of ordinary skill in the art.”22  On the other side of the ledger, juries 
may find that a single prior art reference teaches every element of a patent 
claim and thus renders the claim invalid for “anticipation.”  “Invalidation 
on this ground requires that every element and limitation of the claim was 
previously described in a single prior art reference, either expressly or 
inherently, so as to place a person of ordinary skill in possession of the 
invention.”23
But there is no good reason to think that lay jurors are able to 
successfully place themselves in the shoes of a skilled artisan, or to view all 
the aforementioned issues through a skilled artisan’s eyes.  In high-tech 
patent cases, a person of ordinary skill in the art is usually deemed to have 
a bachelor’s degree in the field of the patent, sometimes accompanied by 
one or more years of experience in that field.24  A lay juror without those
qualifications will naturally find it difficult, if not impossible, to place 
himself in the shoes of a hypothetical person with those qualifications.  
of a lap weld in a certain context).  In addition, juries are often asked to decide the 
“ultimate” obviousness question of whether a skilled artisan would have found the claims 
obvious.  However, this ultimate question is deemed a question of law, so a jury’s resolution 
of it will be given no deference on appeal.  See Rothman v. Target Corp., 556 F.3d 1310, 
1317 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“[t]his court reviews [the] jury’s conclusions on obviousness, a 
question of law, without deference, and the underlying findings of fact, whether explicit or 
implicit within the verdict, for substantial evidence.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 21.  Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 40 (1997). 
 22.  Overhead Door Corp. v. Chamberlain Grp., Inc., 194 F.3d 1261, 1269 (Fed. Cir. 
1999).
 23.  Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., 550 F.3d 1075, 1082 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 24.  See, e.g., Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 480 F.3d 1348, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“The 
district court first found that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have a bachelor’s 
degree in pharmaceutical science or analytical chemistry, and some experience in drugs and 
drug preparation.”); Emerson Elec. Co. v. Suzhou Cleva Elec. Appliance Co., No. 4:13-CV-
1043-SPM, 2015 WL 5768572, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 30, 2015) (“[T]he parties do not 
dispute that one of ordinary skill in the art is someone with a bachelor’s degree in 
mechanical engineering or equivalent technical experience.”); Blue Spike, LLC v. Texas 
Instruments, Inc., No. 6:12-CV-499-MHS-CMC, 2014 WL 5299320, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 
16, 2014) (“the Court finds that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have at least a 
Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or equivalent degree, with a 
background and at least two years’ experience in signal processing, image processing, 
biometric identification, or a related field.”); Nano-Second Tech. Co. v. Dynaflex Int’l, 944 
F. Supp. 2d 855, 861 (C.D. Cal. 2013) (“one of ordinary skill in the art would have a good 
understanding of electronics hardware and mechanical design. Such person will have a 
Bachelor’s degree from a four-year college in Electrical Engineering, Electronics, and 
Mechanical Engineering, and a year of relevant experience.”). 
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How could a lay juror with no computer science background be able to 
appreciate the knowledge and critical thinking skills that a computer 
science bachelor’s degree would impart?  How could this lay juror truly 
place himself in the shoes of a computer science degree-holder?  Asking 
lay jurors to view patent-law issues through the eyes of a skilled artisan 
comes close to an impossible exercise in metaphysics. 
The sources of proof in high-tech patent cases are similarly beyond the 
ken of most lay jurors.  Computer science patent cases often involve 
parsing the source code of the accused product and matching the source 
code against the patent claims to determine infringement.25  Biotechnology 
patent cases often involve using complex imaging techniques, such as X-
ray diffraction or nuclear magnetic resonance, to compare the structure of 
the accused compound against the patent claims.26  There is no reason to 
think that lay jurors are remotely competent to analyze source code, X-ray 
diffraction patterns, or other highly technical sources of proof. 
To be sure, it is nearly universal for patent litigants to come to trial 
with paid technical experts, who are often professors or other academics in 
the field of the patent.27  In theory, these experts are supposed to explain 
complex technologies to lay jurors and phrase these technologies in terms 
that the jurors can understand.28  But this creates its own set of problems.  
Each expert will naturally say that the evidence supports his or her client’s 
position, and a lay juror who has no way of independently evaluating the 
evidence may have no choice but to simply believe one expert over the 
other.  This creates a likelihood that jurors might defer to whichever expert 
comes across as more likeable or learned, without regard to the technical 
merit of what the expert is saying (which the jurors are ill-equipped to 
evaluate in any event). 
As former law professor and current Federal Circuit judge Kimberly 
Moore pointed out: “If juries are unable to understand the technology or 
 25.  For this reason, source code is the first item in many districts’ lists of items that 
must be produced at an early stage of a patent case.  See, e.g., E.D. Tex. Local Patent Rule 
3-4(a); N.D. Cal. Local Patent Rule 3-4(a) (stating that party opposing a claim of patent 
infringement must produce source code or other documentation). 
 26.  See, e.g., Zenith Labs., Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 19 F.3d 1418, 1423 (Fed. 
Cir. 1994) (“In order to establish its case, Bristol had to show that the accused compound 
infringed the claim contained in the patent.  This required Bristol to show that the diffraction 
pattern of cefadroxil DC following its conversion in vivo displayed the same diffraction 
pattern as that of the claimed compound.”) 
 27.  See Edward J. Poplawski, Selection and Use of Experts in Patent Cases, 9 FED.
CIR. B.J. 145 (1999) (“It is axiomatic that technical experts are virtually a sine qua non for 
patent litigation”). 
 28.  See id. (“Technical experts generally perform one or more of the following 
functions: . . . (4) educate the court and the jury as to the underlying technology; and (5) 
testify as to a broad range of patent issues. . . .”). 
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apply the law, their decisions will be based on less meritorious influences 
such as bias, likeability, or emotion.”29  “In short, the less a jury 
understands about the technology, the more likely unrelated issues will 
influence decisionmaking.”30  On that note, there is no shortage of 
tangential issues that skilled patent litigators can raise to try to sway juries 
towards their clients and against their adversaries.  For example, small 
patentees suing large technology companies may raise the “David vs. 
Goliath” theme and cast themselves as a scrappy underdog heroically 
fighting against a giant corporation.31  Conversely, successful companies 
sued by small non-practicing patentees may characterize their adversaries 
as “trolls” who do not make products but use their patents merely to extort 
money from others.32  Furthermore, both patentees and defendants 
commonly begin their trial presentations with testimony from fresh-faced 
corporate representatives — individuals who might have nothing to say 
about the merits of the infringement case — who are put on the witness 
stand simply to humanize the company they serve in front of the jury.33  All 
these tactics can be highly effective on lay jurors who cannot adequately 
evaluate the technical merits of the case and who may therefore seek 
alternative bases for their verdict. 
In sum, lay jurors are ill-equipped to competently decide high-tech 
patent cases.  They will likely find it impossible to put themselves in the 
shoes of a skilled artisan, though they are routinely called upon to do just 
that.  They have little ability to independently evaluate the technical 
evidence in high-tech patent cases.  And their failure to understand the 
technical issues in such cases leaves them acutely vulnerable to “less 
meritorious influences such as bias, likeability, or emotion.”34
 29.  Kimberly A. Moore, Jury Demands: Who’s Asking?, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 847, 
852 (2002). 
 30.  Id. at 852 n. 15. 
 31.  See Colleen V. Chien, Of Trolls, Davids, Goliaths, and Kings: Narratives and 
Evidence in the Litigation of High-Tech Patents, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1571, 1571 (2009) 
(“While each patent dispute is unique, most fit the profile of one of a limited number of 
patent litigation stories. A dispute between an independent inventor and a large company, 
for instance, is often cast in ‘David v. Goliath’ terms.”). 
 32.  See id. (“Patent licensing and enforcement entities who sue have been labeled 
‘trolls.’”). 
 33.  Indeed, courts often deny motions in limine brought to exclude such background 
information about the parties.  See, e.g., Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Sys., Inc., No. 13-CV-
03999-BLF, 2015 WL 4129193, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 8, 2015) (ruling that “both parties 
have a right to introduce their respective companies to the jury and to provide factual 
background information concerning the companies.”); Personalized Media Commc’ns, LLC 
v. Zynga, Inc., No. 2:12-CV-00068-JRG, 2013 WL 10253110, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 30, 
2013) (denying motion in limine “as to the parties’ ability to provide general background 
information on their business.”). 
 34.  Moore, supra note 29. 
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B. How Specialized Patent Juries Could Improve the Adjudicatory 
Process
Based on the foregoing points, it seems self-evident that patent trials 
could be greatly improved by impaneling specialized juries, comprised of 
individuals whose knowledge and experience roughly tracks that of the 
hypothetical skilled artisan.  Members of such specialized juries would be 
far better suited to put themselves in the shoes of a skilled artisan than lay 
jurors because they would (more or less) be skilled artisans.  For example, 
if a skilled artisan for a given patent case were deemed to have a bachelor’s 
degree in computer science, then who better to decide the case than 
specialized jurors with that very credential?  Such specialized jurors could 
read the patent the way a skilled artisan would, apply the knowledge of a 
skilled artisan when deciding whether the patent is obvious, and likewise 
apply the knowledge of a skilled artisan in deciding whether features of the 
accused product are equivalent to features in the patent claims. 
By the same token, such specialized jurors would be far better suited 
than lay jurors to comprehend the sources of proof that are commonly used 
in high-tech patent cases.  Someone with a bachelor’s degree in computer 
science, for example, would likely be able to read and understand the 
source code that may be introduced in a computer science patent trial.  
Someone with a bachelor’s degree in biology or biochemistry would likely 
have familiarity with X-ray diffraction, nuclear magnetic resonance, and 
other common techniques for showing the structure of organic molecules.  
In sum, specialized jurors would be far less likely than lay jurors to be “lost 
at sea” when complex scientific evidence is introduced at trial. 
In addition, because specialized jurors would better understand the 
subject matter of a high-tech patent suit, they would be relatively resistant 
to persuasion by “less meritorious influences such as bias, likeability, or 
emotion.”35  Indeed, patent litigators might be less likely to even employ 
emotional themes — such as the “troll” or the “David vs. Goliath” themes 
discussed above — if their audiences were a group of technical specialists 
instead of a group of lay jurors.  Consider how patent litigation currently 
plays out in the International Trade Commission, or ITC.  The ITC is a 
Federal administrative body that can block the importation of goods that 
are found to infringe a U.S. patent.36  Unlike district court patent trials, ITC 
trials contain no juries.  Instead, ITC trials are decided by Administrative 
Law Judges (ALJs) who frequently have technical (i.e., scientific) 
 35.  Id.
 36.  See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B), (d)(1) (granting the ITC authority to investigate 
unfair practices in import trade and exclude illegal articles from entry into the United 
States).  
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backgrounds.37  In this author’s experience, ITC trials are far less likely 
than jury trials to feature emotionally charged arguments or themes.  
Indeed, many ITC judges choose not to hear closing arguments at all,38
which is the most common point of the proceeding where trial lawyers 
deploy their most heated emotional rhetoric.39  If specialized juries replaced 
lay juries in patent trials, one might expect the tenor of these trials to move 
closer to dry, technical ITC proceedings and move further away from 
theatrical, emotional proceedings.  This would be a decidedly good thing, 
as jurors should decide patent cases on the technical merits rather than their 
gut judgments about which party, witness, or lawyer is more emotionally 
appealing.
Specialized juries could also provide other, less-obvious benefits, and 
offer intriguing new possibilities to improve patent litigation.  Consider, for 
example, jury verdict forms.  Currently, verdict forms in patent cases are 
“black box” forms where the jury checks off whether it found the patent 
infringed or invalid, but provides no written explanation for why it reached 
its decision or what evidence it used to support that decision.40  The 
Supreme Court, Federal Circuit, and legal commentators have all noted the 
concern that these “black box” verdicts impede appellate review by 
preventing the reviewing court from understanding the reasoning behind 
the jury’s decision.41
 37.  See Jacqueline Lee, Is the U.S. International Trade Commission Protectionist? A 
Comparative Study of Border Enforcement Measures, 40 AIPLA Q.J. 593, 617 (2012) (“The 
ITC is known for its expertise in regard to patent infringement actions for two general 
reasons: one, the vast majority of cases heard by the ALJs at the ITC involve the 
infringement of patent rights; and two, many ALJs and Commissioners have technical 
backgrounds.”); Note, Recasting the U.S. International Trade Commission’s Role in the 
Patent System, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2337, 2352 (2013) (“The ITC is much faster than either 
the district courts or the PTO; in addition, its expert ALJs are both technical experts on par 
with PTO administrative patent judges (and much better than lay district judges or 
juries) . . .”). 
 38.  See, e.g., Inv. No. 337-TA-800, Order No. 2, at § 10.2 (Aug. 31, 2011) (setting 
forth ALJ Theodore Essex’s usual practice of not hearing closing arguments); Inv. No. 337-
TA-666, Order No. 2, at § 10.2 (Jan. 14, 2009) (same with ALJ James Gildea). 
 39.  See James H. Roberts, Jr., The SEC of Closing Arguments, 23 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC.
203, 206 (1999) (“Emotion is a powerful element in effective closing arguments. . . . [O]ne 
can conclude that jurors make the critical decisions charged to them by the court on an 
emotional basis.  Therefore, when lawyers plan their closing arguments, lawyers must 
consider emotion, especially in developing the story of the case and in delivering the 
story.”). 
 40.  See, e.g., McGinley v. Franklin Sports, Inc., 262 F.3d 1339, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2001) 
(“Due to the ‘black box’ nature of the jury’s verdict, it is impossible to determine which of 
the above pieces of evidence, alone or in combination, carried the day in the jury room, and 
how much weight was assigned to each piece.”). 
 41.  See, e.g., Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 39 n.8 
(1997) (noting “the concern over unreviewability due to black-box jury verdicts”); 
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But if lay jurors were replaced with specialized jurors who hold at 
least a bachelor’s degree in the field of the patent, it might become feasible 
to ask the jury to provide written explanations for its decision, somewhat 
akin to the written finding of fact that district judges provide in bench 
trials42 or the written findings of fact that ALJ’s provide in ITC 
proceedings.43  The jury might be provided with a laptop computer in the 
jury room, and asked to collectively draft a short statement explaining the 
basis for their verdict.  Even a two-to-three page statement — the kind of 
thing a group of college graduates might be able to draft in a few hours or 
less — would be much more illuminating than the impenetrable “black 
box” verdict forms that reviewing courts currently face.  These specialized 
jurors should be competent to give a written explanation of why they 
reached their verdict, since persons with at least a bachelor’s degree in the 
field of the patent surely have experience writing in that field.44
II. SPECIALIZED PATENT JURIES WOULD BE CONSTITUTIONAL
Of course, no matter how much specialized juries might improve the 
adjudication of patent cases, they could not be seriously promoted if their 
existence would be unconstitutional.  There are at least two constitutional 
objections that one might plausibly raise against specialized patent juries.  
First, one might argue that specialized juries would violate patent litigants’ 
Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial.  Second, one might argue that the 
exclusion of laypersons from specialized juries would violate those 
laypersons’ Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection.  However, as 
discussed in subparts (A) and (B) below, specialized juries are actually 
consistent with both of these constitutional guarantees. 
A. The Seventh Amendment 
The Seventh Amendment provides that, “[i]n suits at common law, 
Structural Rubber Products Co. v. Park Rubber Co., 749 F.2d 707, 718 (Fed. Cir. 1984) 
(“Concerns have been expressed by the patent bar that a jury trial creates a black box into 
which patents are thrown and emerge intact or invalid by an unknown and unknowable 
process”); Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases-an Empirical Peek Inside 
the Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365, 368 (2000) (“The ‘black box’ nature of jury verdicts 
leaves the Federal Circuit unable to correct inaccuracy or bias on the part of jurors.”). 
 42.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(1) (providing that the court must find and state the facts 
in actions tried without a jury). 
 43.  See 19 CFR § 207.114(b)(1) (providing that the ITC must include findings of fact 
in its initial determination).  
 44.  Indeed, under this Article’s proposal to offer jury commissions to specially-
selected individuals who have a technical degree (see Part IV, infra), the government might 
also select for individuals who have demonstrated proficiency in clear expository writing.   
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where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial 
by jury shall be preserved . . . .”45  The Supreme Court has held that the 
“[t]he right of trial by jury thus preserved [by the Seventh Amendment] is 
the right which existed under the English common law when the 
amendment was adopted.”46  Thus, in determining whether a given practice 
or procedure violates the Seventh Amendment, the Supreme Court looks 
first and foremost to the established English practices that existed as of 
1791, when the Seventh Amendment was adopted.47
Under this historical analysis, there are strong grounds to conclude 
that the Seventh Amendment allows civil suits to be tried before 
specialized jurors who have familiarity with the general subject matter of 
the suit.  In fact, specialized juries were well established in English 
practice, from the Middle Ages up through the time of the Seventh 
Amendment’s adoption.48
Some early English examples show the specialized jury concept being 
carried out to almost parodic lengths.  For example, a jury of “cooks and 
fishmongers” presided over the trial of a defendant accused of selling bad 
food, a jury of matrons was impaneled to decide a pregnancy-related claim, 
and a jury of booksellers and printers was impaneled to decide a libel 
trial.49  Moreover, the English practice of using specialized juries became 
only more established in the decades leading up to the enactment of the 
Seventh Amendment.  In 1730, for example, Parliament formally codified 
the specialized jury by passing a law that allowed any litigant to request 
 45.  U.S. CONST., AMENDMENT VII. 
 46.  Balt. & Carolina Line v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657 (1935). 
 47.  See, e.g., Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 348-49 
(1998) (applying historical English practice to determine whether statutory copyright 
damages claim must be tried to a jury under the Seventh Amendment); Granfinanciera, S.A. 
v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 43 (1989) (applying historical English practice to determine 
whether fraudulent conveyance claim brought by bankruptcy trustee carries Seventh 
Amendment right to jury trial); Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 476 & 482 (1935) 
(applying historical English practice to determine whether additur by trial judge violated 
Seventh Amendment). 
 48.  See, e.g., Shaw, supra note 2, at 7 (“In the second half of the seventeenth century, it 
was not uncommon for a jury to include only property owners or experts in the subject 
matter of the litigation”); White, supra note 2, at 787 (“The use of expert juries is rooted in 
English common law.  Originally, juries in England were often selected for their special 
knowledge of the issues at trial.”); see also The Case for Special Juries in Complex Civil 
Litigation, 89 YALE L.J. 1155, 1163 (1980) (“Special juries are in fact part of a long 
historical tradition in England.  Juries of particularly qualified persons have been in use 
since the middle ages to decide cases that might be outside the experience of ordinary 
jurors.”). 
 49.  Kristy Lee Bertelsen, From Specialized Courts to Specialized Juries: Calling for 
Professional Juries in Complex Civil Litigation, 3 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 1, 10-
11 (1998). 
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such a jury.50  The specialized jury then reached its apotheosis after 1756, 
when the famous British jurist Lord Mansfield ascended to Chief Justice of 
the King’s Bench and began to routinely impanel specialized juries of 
merchants to decide important mercantile cases.51  Given the transformative 
effect that Lord Mansfield’s cases had on mercantile law — he is often 
called “the father of modern mercantile law”52 — his special merchant 
juries would have been well known on both sides of the Atlantic.  If the 
Seventh Amendment right to jury trial was truly meant to track 18th-century 
English practice, then there could be no better or more prominent example 
of that English practice than Lord Mansfield’s merchant juries.  Thus, the 
relevant English practice strongly supports the argument that specialized 
juries are consistent with the Seventh Amendment. 
Furthermore, many American state court systems have historically 
provided for specialized juries,53 and a few continue to this day.54  Although 
 50.  An Act for the Better Regulation of Juries, 3 Geo. 2, c. 25 (1730) (Eng.). See also
William V. Luneburg & Mark A. Nordenberg, Specially Qualified Juries and Expert 
Nonjury Tribunals: Alternatives for Coping with the Complexities of Modern Civil 
Litigation, 67 VA. L. REV. 887, 903 (1981) (“In 1730, Parliament underscored the 
legitimacy of the special jury when it passed a statute that declared the right of any litigant, 
in either a civil or criminal case, to move for a special jury.”). 
 51.  See Luneburg & Nordenberg, supra note 50, at 903 (“The most extensive use of 
special juries came in the second half of the century, however, when Lord Mansfield began 
to use a trained corps of merchants regularly as jurors in commercial cases.  This practice 
developed during his term as Chief Justice of the King’s Bench from 1756 until 1788, and 
apparently was continued for some time thereafter.”); James C. Oldham, The Origins of the 
Special Jury, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 137, 164 (1983) (“During the late eighteenth century, for 
example, special juries of merchants well-versed in mercantile customs helped Lord 
Mansfield articulate and order principles of commercial law.”); Lochlan F. Shelfer, Special
Juries in the Supreme Court, 123 YALE L.J. 208, 214 (2013) (“Although the practice of 
special juries in general, and special juries of merchants in particular, originated in the 
medieval period, Lord Mansfield brought special juries of merchants into widespread use 
upon his appointment as Chief Justice of King’s Bench in 1756.  Under Mansfield, special 
juries of merchants became prevalent throughout England and the colonies in the late 
eighteenth century.”). 
 52.  John Morey Maurice, A New Personal Limited Liability Shield for General 
Partners: But Not All Partners Are Treated the Same, 43 GONZ. L. REV. 369, 376 (2008) 
(“During his thirty-two year career as a judge, Lord Mansfield became known in England as 
the ‘father of modern mercantile law.’”). 
 53.  See Laura G. Dooley, National Juries for National Cases: Preserving Citizen 
Participation in Large-Scale Litigation, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 411, 438-39 (2008) (“More than 
half of American states had statutes authorizing the use of special juries during the first half 
of the twentieth century . . . .”); Shaw, supra note 2, at 26 (“Seventeen states have used 
some form of a specialized jury, basing their authority primarily on state statutes.”); White, 
supra note 2, at 787-88 (“In the United States, expert juries were provided for by statute in 
many states by the first part of the twentieth century.”). 
 54.  See, e.g., 10 Del. C. § 4506 (allowing for special juries in “complex civil case[s]”); 
Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 37-23-104 (providing that certain water drainage cases be heard 
before individuals “who have some knowledge of the costs and benefits of farm drainage 
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states are not bound by the Seventh Amendment,55 many of the states that 
provided specialized juries also have state constitutional provisions 
comparable to the Seventh Amendment — provisions that “preserved 
inviolate the right of trial by jury.”56  The fact that these states enacted 
specialized juries alongside their constitutional jury-trial protections 
strongly suggests that the traditional American understanding of “trial by 
jury” does not preclude specialized juries. 
In sum, the historical English practice — the lodestar for Seventh 
Amendment jurisprudence — indicates that specialized juries are consistent 
with the Seventh Amendment, and state practice further suggests that 
specialized juries are consistent with American jury trial rights.  Thus, 
impaneling specialized juries of skilled artisans for patent cases appears not 
to violate the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. 
B. The Fourteenth Amendment 
The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in relevant part, that “[n]o state 
shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of 
the laws.”57  While the Fourteenth Amendment does not directly apply 
against the Federal government (and therefore could not be directly 
invoked to invalidate a Federal specialized jury system), the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s equal protection guarantee is incorporated against the 
Federal government through the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause.58
Thus, “the Fifth Amendment imposes on the Federal Government the same 
standard required of state legislation by the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”59
That being the case, would it violate equal protection for the Federal 
government to impanel specialized patent juries consisting of individuals 
who are skilled in the field of the patent?  Would this violate the equal 
protection rights of all other individuals, who would not be eligible to serve 
on these specialized juries? 
and shall be sworn as a special jury to try the case . . . .”). 
 55.  Before the 20th century, the Bill of Rights (including, of course, the Seventh 
Amendment) was deemed wholly inapplicable to the states.  Barron v. Balt., 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 
243 (1833).  In the 20th century, the Supreme Court “incorporated” most Bill of Rights 
protections to apply to the states, but the Seventh Amendment has never been so 
incorporated. See, e.g., GTFM, LLC v. TKN Sales, Inc., 257 F.3d 235, 245 (2d Cir. 2001) 
(“[T]he Seventh Amendment, though guaranteeing the right to a jury trial for legal issues in 
cases tried in federal courts, does not apply to the States.”). 
 56.  Luneburg & Nordenberg, supra note 50, at 903.   
 57.  U.S. CONST., AMENDMENT XIV, § 1.
 58.  See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (noting that equal protection and due 
process are not mutually exclusive, and that discrimination may violate both clauses).   
 59.  Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 226 n.6 (1981). 
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The answer is most likely “no.”  As an initial matter, “the Supreme 
Court has not recognized a Constitutional mandate that jury pools in civil 
cases reflect a fair cross-section of the community.”60  And even in the 
criminal context where the lion’s share of jury-representation cases has 
arisen, successful equal protection challenges have generally been limited 
to the exclusion of discrete racial, gender, or ethnic groups.  As the 
Supreme Court explained in Lockhart v. McCree:
Our prior jury-representativeness cases, whether based on the 
fair-cross-section component of the Sixth Amendment61 or the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, have 
involved such groups as blacks, women, and Mexican-
Americans . . . . Because these groups were excluded for reasons 
completely unrelated to the ability of members of the group to 
serve as jurors in a particular case, the exclusion raised at least 
the possibility that the composition of juries would be arbitrarily 
skewed . . .  In addition, the exclusion from jury service of large 
groups of individuals not on the basis of their inability to serve as 
jurors, but on the basis of some immutable characteristic such as 
race, gender, or ethnic background, undeniably gave rise to an 
“appearance of unfairness.”62
Limiting patent juries to those skilled in the relevant art would not 
raise any of those concerns.  While laypersons would be excluded from 
specialized juries, their exclusion would not be “unrelated to the ability of 
members of the group to serve as jurors in a particular case.”63  To the 
contrary, their exclusion would be closely related to their ability to serve, 
as it would be based on the logical point that those skilled in the field of a 
given patent are best suited to decide a lawsuit over such a patent.64  By 
analogy, Lockhart held that limiting a capital-case jury pool to those who 
were philosophically willing to apply the death penalty was constitutional, 
because this limitation “is carefully designed to serve the State’s 
concededly legitimate interest in obtaining a single jury that can properly 
and impartially apply the law to the facts of the case at both the guilt and 
sentencing phases of a capital trial.”65  The same could be said about 
limiting patent juries to those skilled in the art: this limitation would be 
“carefully designed to serve the [government’s] concededly legitimate 
interest in obtaining a single jury that can properly and impartially apply 
 60.  Fleming v. Chi. Transit Auth., 397 F. App’x 249, 249 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 61.  The Sixth Amendment is what grants the constitutional right to jury trial in 
criminal cases.  U.S. CONST., AMENDMENT VI.   
 62.  Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 175 (1986)  (internal citations omitted). 
 63.  Id.
 64.  See supra Part II(B). 
 65.  Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 175-176.  
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the law to the facts of the case.” 
One might draw another analogy to governmental licensing laws that 
restrict who may enter a given profession.  When these laws are challenged 
under the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection clause, they will be 
upheld as long as they are rationally related to the demands of the 
profession.66  This is a highly deferential test; courts “need only determine 
whether the licensing scheme has a ‘conceivable basis’ on which it might 
survive rational basis scrutiny.”67
Limiting patent juries to skilled artisans would essentially impose a 
licensing requirement, as only skilled artisans would be “licensed” to serve 
on such juries.  Yet it is hard to imagine that this limitation would fail 
rational basis review.  As discussed in Part I(B) above, there are numerous 
rational reasons why skilled artisans would be more competent to decide 
patent cases than lay jurors.  Thus, applying the licensing analogy, limiting 
patent juries to skilled artisans would seem to pass constitutional muster 
under the equal protection clause. 
One might nonetheless object that some groups of skilled artisans are 
heavily skewed against certain racial and gender groups — groups that are 
at or near the core of Fourteenth Amendment protections.68  For example, 
in 2013 only 5% of professional scientists and engineers were African-
American and only 30% were women69 — far below these groups’ overall 
representation in the population.  In some fields the disparities are even 
starker; for example, only 2.9% of life scientists were African-American in 
2013, and only 25.4% of computer and math scientists were women.70
Thus, establishing specialized patent juries of skilled artisans might result 
in jury pools that are heavily skewed against certain racial or gender 
 66.  See Stephen A. Meli, Do You Have A License to Say That? Occupational Licensing 
and Internet Speech, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 753, 757 (2014) (“The Supreme Court 
scrutinizes challenges to government licensing schemes under the rational basis test.  The 
Supreme Court has held that occupational licensing laws are constitutional so long as the 
qualifications ‘have a rational connection with the applicant’s fitness or capacity to practice’ 
his profession.”) (quoting Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs of State of N.M, 353 U.S. 232, 
239 (1957)).   
 67.  Nat’l Ass’n for Advancement of Psychoanalysis v. Cal. Bd. of Psychology, 228 
F.3d 1043, 1051 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 68.  See, e.g., City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) 
(“Legislative classifications based on gender also call for a heightened standard of review” 
under the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection clause); Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 
385, 391 (1969) (“the core of the Fourteenth Amendment is the prevention of meaningful 
and unjustified official distinctions based on race . . . .”). 
 69.  National Center for Science Engineering Statistics, Women, Minorities, and 
Persons with Disabilities in Science and Engineering: Overall Trends, NAT’L SCI. FOUND.
(2013), http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/2015/nsf15311/digest/theme5.cfm#trends 
[https://perma.cc/GB7Z-PER2]. 
 70.  Id. (“Blacks” and “Women” tabs). 
2016] SPECIALIZED JURIES FOR PATENT CASES 1193 
groups.  Would this be unconstitutional under the equal protection clause? 
It might at least be unsettling.  All else being equal, one would not 
want any classes of lawsuits to be decided by jury pools that are skewed 
against certain races or genders.  And Part III(C) of this Article offers 
concrete suggestions for ways to reduce racial and gender disparities in 
specialized patent jury pools.  But even if it were impossible to completely 
eliminate such disparities, this would not mean that specialized patent 
juries would violate the equal protection clause.  To the contrary, a facially 
neutral law that is not intended to discriminate against a protected class 
does not violate equal protection just because it has a disparate impact on a 
protected class.71  A law establishing specialized patent juries would be just 
that sort of law.  While potential racial or gender disparities among 
specialized patent juries would be something to recognize and address 
wherever possible, such disparities would not render these juries 
unconstitutional under the equal protection clause. 
III. A CONCRETE PROPOSAL FOR IMPANELING SPECIALIZED JURIES
IN PATENT CASES
Having established that specialized patent juries would be both 
beneficial and constitutional, the next step is to decide whether they are 
logistically feasible.  As noted above, several commentators have expressed 
skepticism about whether it would be feasible to impanel specialized juries 
of skilled artisans for patent cases.72  To address such concerns, this Article 
gives a concrete proposal for how to impanel such juries and then presents 
survey data suggesting that this proposal would be feasible. 
A. The Proposal:  Offering Skilled Artisans One-Year Jury Terms for 
a Competitive Salary 
The essence of this Article’s proposal is for the Federal government to 
offer one-year jury commissions to individuals who hold at least a 
bachelor’s degree in the fields that spawn the most technically complex 
patent cases, such as computer science, electrical engineering, and the life 
sciences.73  These jurors would be paid a significant salary, on the order of 
 71.  See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (“we have not held that a law, 
neutral on its face and serving ends otherwise within the power of government to pursue, is 
invalid under the Equal Protection Clause simply because it may affect a greater proportion 
of one race than of another.”). 
 72.  See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text (explaining certain commentators’ 
skepticism over the ability to find enough qualified jurors). 
 73.  See supra note 7 (explaining how many if not most complex patent cases implicate 
computer science, electrical engineering, and/or the life sciences).   
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$100,000 for their one-year term of service.  To aid in recruiting a critical 
mass of jurors, the specialized jury pools would be established in the 10-12 
judicial districts that have the highest concentration of technology jobs 
and/or research institutions.  These districts most likely include the places 
such specialized jurors are already living or would be most willing to live.  
The patent venue statute74 could be amended to require that patent lawsuits 
be brought in one of those districts (a proposal that would have a similar 
effect as the venue-reform bills that are currently pending in Congress).75
Alternatively, district judges handling patent cases could make a 
preliminary assessment of whether the patent-in-suit implicates complex 
technology, and they could transfer the case to one of the aforementioned 
judicial districts if the judge determined that the patented technology is 
complex enough to warrant a specialized jury.76
Each complex patent case would be tried before a panel of jurors who 
hold a bachelor’s degree, at least, in the broad technological field of the 
patent.  Computer science patent cases would be tried before individuals 
who hold a degree in computer science; biotech patent cases would be tried 
before individuals who hold a degree in the life sciences; etc.  As noted 
above, a bachelor’s degree in the field of the patent — sometimes 
accompanied by one or more years’ experience — generally equals the 
level of ordinary skill in the art for most high-tech patent cases.77  Thus, by 
 74.  28 U.S.C. § 1400(b). 
 75.  For example, the proposed Innovation Act would generally restrict patent venue to 
judicial districts where either: (1) the patent’s named inventor conducted research and 
development; (2) the patent-owner developed a product practicing the patent; or (3) the 
defendant has a regular and established physical facility giving rise to the infringement.  As 
a practical matter, this Act would funnel most patent suits into the districts with a large 
number of research institutions and/or technology companies — the same districts that 
would be attractive places for specialized patent jurors to live.  Innovation Act, H.R. 9, 
114th Cong. § 3(281B)(b) (2015). 
 76.  Judges already have broad discretionary power to transfer civil cases to other 
districts “for the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interests of justice.”  28 U.S.C. 
§ 1404(a).  Transferring a complex patent case to a district that could better decide the case 
through a specialized jury would seem to satisfy at least the “interests of justice” prong of 
Section 1404(a).  This would likely be enough to warrant transfer under Section 1404(a), 
unless the transferee district was markedly inconvenient for the parties and witnesses.  See
Moses v. Bus. Card Exp., Inc., 929 F.2d 1131, 1137 (6th Cir. 1991) (“in ruling on a motion 
to transfer under § 1404(a), a district court should consider the private interests of the 
parties, including their convenience and the convenience of potential witnesses, as well as 
other public-interest concerns, such as systemic integrity and fairness, which come under 
the rubric of ‘interests of justice.’”) (emphasis added).  Moreover, given this Article’s 
proposal to establish specialized jury pools in 10-12 districts nationwide, it is likely that at 
least one of these 10-12 districts would be reasonably convenient for the parties and 
witnesses in any given patent case. 
 77.  See supra note 24 and accompanying text (providing cases suggesting that a person 
of ordinary skill within a technical field is one with a bachelor’s degree in that field or 
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having high-tech patent cases heard before specialized jurors who possess 
at least a bachelor’s degree in the relevant field, this Article’s proposal 
would allow these cases to be heard before jurors who possess roughly the 
same level of ordinary skill in the art alluded to throughout patent law.  
Likewise, by assembling a large pool of specialized jurors and retaining 
them for a one-year term of service, this proposal strives to ensure that 
there would be an adequate supply of skilled artisans ready and available to 
hear any high-tech patent cases that come up for trial. 
Under this proposal, the cost of the jurors’ salaries would be offset by 
surcharges on patent litigants.  The surcharges could be relatively modest; 
perhaps $25,000 per party.  While this sum may seem significant at first 
blush, high-stakes patent cases typically cost each party $3-$5 million to 
litigate through to verdict.78  Even low-stakes patent cases, where less than 
$1 million is at stake, cost each party an average of $600,000 to litigate.79
Viewed in this light, requiring litigants to pay an extra $25,000 in exchange 
for having their case heard before a specialized jury that is more likely to 
issue an informed verdict seems quite reasonable.  Indeed, many patent 
litigants with strong cases would welcome this development.80
The $25,000 surcharge figure was derived as follows: patent trials 
average two weeks in length,81 so a specialized juror could easily be 
expected to hear 18 trials during a one-year term of service (even with a 
healthy margin of error for unusually-lengthy trials or deliberation periods).  
At a $100,000 annual salary, this means that each juror would cost roughly 
$5,500 per trial.  For panels of nine jurors (halfway between the minimum 
number of six, and the maximum number of twelve jurors contemplated by 
equivalent technical experience).  
 78.  See American Intellectual Property Law Association (AIPLA) Report of the 
Economic Survey (2015) at 37 (finding that the average per-party cost of patent litigation is 
$3.1 million when $10-$25 million in potential damages is at stake, and that the average 
cost rises to $5 million when more than $25 million is at stake.)  
 79.  Id.
 80.  See Fisher, supra note 2, at 55 (“A litigant with a strong, but complex case, and 
many millions of dollars riding on the outcome, would be ill-advised to simply roll the dice 
rather than spending a comparatively small sum of money to dramatically increase his 
chances of achieving his rightful victory.”). 
 81.  See, e.g., John E. Kidd & Keeto H. Sabharwal, The District of Delaware: An Ideal 
Venue for Patent Litigators, DEL. LAW., Winter 2000, 16, 17 (“[T]he Delaware District 
Court generally limits patent trials to two weeks . . . .”); Stephen D. Susman & Thomas M. 
Melsheimer, Trial by Agreement: How Trial Lawyers Hold the Key to Improving Jury Trials 
in Civil Cases, 32 REV. LITIG. 431, 445 (2013) (“In the Eastern District of Texas, for 
example, long known as one of the most active patent venues in the country, cases involving 
complex technology and billions of dollars in alleged damages are routinely tried in two 
weeks or less, and less complex patent trials are often concluded with five or six total days 
of trial time.”).  In this author’s experience as well, two-week patent trials are the norm. 
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the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure82), the total per-trial jury cost would 
be roughly $50,000.  Split evenly between the plaintiff and defendant, each 
party could be charged $25,000 to make up for the cost of the specialized 
jurors’ salaries. 
In actuality, the effective cost to the parties would be significantly less 
than that, since specialized juries would impart cost savings to the parties in 
the form of shortened trials.  As discussed above, specialized juries would 
be less susceptible to tangential, emotional arguments,83 and might even 
view such arguments as an unwelcome distraction from the technical merits 
of the case.  As a result, savvy lawyers might omit these arguments (and 
the witnesses used to support these arguments) if their patent cases were 
tried before specialized juries, just as those arguments are commonly 
omitted from ITC proceedings.  In addition, the parties’ expert witnesses 
would likewise eliminate (or greatly shorten) background tutorials on the 
scientific field of the patent, since they would be speaking to an audience 
with a significant level of skill and training in this field. 
Furthermore, trials could be shortened even further by taking 
advantage of the fact that specialized jurors under this Article’s proposal 
would be repeat players in patent litigation.  At the start of their terms of 
service, such jurors could also be given a one-to-two day primer on patent 
law.  This would obviate the need for some of the more tedious features of 
patent trials, such as playing the Federal Judicial Center’s introductory 
video on patent litigation84 or having the trial judge orally recite lengthy 
boilerplate jury instructions on infringement, invalidity, and other basic 
patent law concepts.85  The patent video and boilerplate jury instructions 
are designed to give lay jurors some minimal familiarity with the law that 
governs their factual decision-making, but such instruction would be 
superfluous if a case were tried before repeat player specialized jurors who 
have already been tutored on the basics of patent law. 
If these changes (i.e., minimizing tangential arguments, technical 
tutorials, and patent-law tutorials) shorten patent trials by just one day, each 
 82.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 48(a) (“Number of Jurors: A jury must begin with at least 6 and 
no more than 12 members . . .”). 
 83.  See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
 84.  Federal Judicial Center, The Patent Process: An Overview for Jurors, YOUTUBE
(Nov. 22, 2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ax7QHQTbKQE 
[https://perma.cc/JN7X-6HDH].   
 85.  For example, the Northern District of California’s Model Patent Jury Instructions 
are 54 pages long, including lengthy boilerplate instructions on what a patent is, how it is 
obtained, and the meaning of such ubiquitous patent-law concepts as infringement and 
invalidity.  Model Patent Jury Instructions, N.D. CAL (July 16, 2015), 
http://www.cand.uscourts.gov/juryinstructions [https://perma.cc/ZSM2-CHZ7].   
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party could save $10,000 or more in attorneys’ fees86  Notably, that figure 
counts only the direct costs of a trial day; if one considers indirect costs 
(such as the costs of preparing trial outlines and rehearsing trial testimony), 
then the cost savings of eliminating a trial day would be even greater.  
Thus, while the nominal cost of this Article’s proposal would be $25,000 
per patent litigant, the actual effective cost would be far less, and it might 
even approach zero. 
B. Survey Data Suggests That This Proposal Would Be Feasible 
Of course, the feasibility of this proposal ultimately hinges on whether 
the government would be able to attract a critical mass of specialized jurors 
who would be willing to serve one-year jury terms in exchange for  
$100,000 salaries.  As a general rule, individuals with at least a bachelor’s 
degree in a scientific field have relatively bright career prospects, and 
might not be willing to delay or interrupt their careers to serve a year as a 
patent juror. 
To test the feasibility of this Article’s proposal, I surveyed 389 
undergraduate and graduate students at sixteen U.S. colleges and 
universities.87  Each student was either majoring in or pursuing graduate 
degrees in one of the two broad fields that spawn much complex patent 
litigation: (1) computer science and electrical engineering, or (2) the life 
sciences.  After ascertaining their field of study, each student was asked the 
following two questions: 
 86.  In 2014, for example, the average “blended” rate for law firm partners and 
associates in patent cases was roughly $300 per hour. Enterprise Legal Management Trends 
Report, LEXISNEXIS COUNSELLINK 18 (2014).  Assuming that a party’s trial team consisted 
of five attorneys, each hour of trial would cost that party roughly $1,500.  Thus, shaving just 
one day from the length of patent trials could save each party $10,000 or more.   
 87.  As stated in note 6, these colleges and universities are: Bates College, the 
University of California-Berkeley, Claremont McKenna College, Colorado College, the 
University of Florida, Grinnell College, the University of Idaho, the University of Illinois, 
the University of Massachusetts, the University of Mississippi, the University of North 
Dakota, Penn State University, Stanford University, Trinity University (Texas), Wellesley 
College, and the University of Wyoming.  A full description of my survey methodology is 
provided at Appendix A, and a sample survey form is provided at Appendix B.  
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The decision to survey both undergraduate and graduate students was 
deliberate.  As noted above, the level of ordinary skill in the art for most 
high-tech patent cases is a bachelor’s degree in the field of the patent, 
sometimes accompanied by one or more years’ experience.88  This means 
that newly minted college graduates and newly minted master’s or Ph.D. 
degree holders would bring complementary strengths to a specialized 
patent jury.  The college graduates would more precisely track the 
educational attainment of a skilled artisan, yet they might fall short on work 
experience even if summer internships and work during college were 
considered.  Masters or Ph.D. graduates would more likely possess the 
requisite work experience due to their greater age, yet they might have 
some difficulty going “back in time” to remember what skills and 
knowledge they possessed at the time of their bachelor’s degree.  Thus, a 
jury consisting of both bachelor’s degree and advanced degree holders 
would be desirable, as each group of jurors would complement the other in 
terms of the skills and experience that a hypothetical skilled artisan would 
have.
The survey results were highly encouraging for this Article’s 
proposal.  Of the overall survey respondents, 73.3% stated that they would 
“seriously consider” a one-year term of post-graduation patent jury service 
for $100,000 or less.89  The precise breakdown of survey responses can be 
seen in the following bar graph, which shows the percentage of respondents 
who would seriously consider a one-year term of patent jury service for 
$50,000, $75,000, $100,000, more than $100,000, and not at all. 
 88.  See supra note 24 and accompanying text (providing cases suggesting that a person 
of ordinary skill within a technical field is one with a bachelor’s degree in that field or 
equivalent technical experience).  
 89.  This percentage was derived by taking the number of survey respondents who 
would “seriously consider” patent jury service for $100,000, $75,000, or $50,000, and 
dividing this number by the overall number of survey respondents. 
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When one breaks down the survey responses by education level, 
79.9% of undergraduate respondents would seriously consider post-
graduation patent jury service for $100,000 or less, while 66.3% of 
graduate respondents would do so.  This disparity is not surprising; 
advanced degree holders command a greater salary than bachelor’s degree 
holders in the marketplace, and would therefore be expected to demand a 
higher salary in exchange for delaying their careers by a year.  Advanced 
degree holders are also more likely to be supporting families, due to their 
greater age, which also might cause them to demand a higher salary.  
Nonetheless, the fact that over 66% of graduate students would seriously 
consider post-graduation jury service under this proposal (together with 
nearly 80% of undergraduates) suggests that it would be feasible to staff 
patent juries with a mixture of bachelor’s degree and advanced degree 
holders.
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Finally, breaking down the survey responses by area of study, 82.3% 
of those studying life science would seriously consider patent jury service 
for $100,000 or less, while 63.4% of those studying computer science or 
electrical engineering would do so.  Again, this disparity is not surprising, 
given that computer scientists and electrical engineers generally earn more 
in the marketplace than do life scientists.90  Nonetheless, the fact that a 
strong majority of respondents in both categories would seriously consider 
patent jury service under this proposal suggests that it would be feasible to 
employ specialized patent juries across a broad range of scientific fields. 
 90.   According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the average salary for computer 
scientists in the United States was $113,190 as of May 2014, the average salary for 
electrical engineers was $95,780, and the average salary for biological scientists was 
$79,200.  BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, MAY 2014 NATIONAL OCCUPATIONAL 
EMPLOYMENT AND WAGE ESTIMATES (2014), http://www.bls.gov/oes/2014/may/oes_nat.htm 
[https://perma.cc/JFY5-S5QQ].  
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C. Other Considerations 
The foregoing sections suggest that it would be feasible to assemble 
specialized patent juries consisting of newly minted bachelor’s and 
advanced degree-holders in technical fields, as a large percentage of such 
individuals would be willing to serve on a specialized jury for an annual 
salary ($100,000) that could be covered by modest surcharges on patent 
litigants.  Nonetheless, there are some other considerations that should be 
taken into account to improve these proposed patent juries. 
The first consideration is age.  Staffing patent juries with newly 
minted bachelor’s and advanced degree holders would yield a rather young 
jury pool.  Even newly minted Ph.Ds. are, on average, only 33 years old.91
 91.   Lynn O’Shaughnessy, 12 Reasons Not to Get a Ph.D., CBS MONEYWATCH (July 
10, 2012), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/12-reasons-not-to-get-a-phd/ 
[https://perma.cc/XD64-LQ6K]. 
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Newly minted college graduates are obviously even younger.  While there 
is nothing intrinsically wrong with relatively young patent juries — 
particularly if the level of ordinary skill in the art would be attained at a 
relatively young age — a jury pool with virtually no middle-aged or older 
individuals might present bad optics.  To address this issue, it might be 
desirable for the government to recruit older patent jurors from the ranks of 
technology companies, in addition to younger patent jurors straight out of 
college or university.  While I have not surveyed technology workers to see 
whether they would be willing to serve on specialized patent juries, it 
stands to reason that at least some would be.  Indeed, technology 
companies whose products and services are heavily patented (or who 
frequently face patent lawsuits) might even encourage their skilled 
employees to take one-year sabbaticals as patent jurors, so that these 
workers could learn about the patent system first-hand.  It is quite possible 
that a one-year stint as a specialized patent juror would become a valuable 
credential in industries that revolve heavily around patents. 
Another consideration, alluded to in Part III(B) above, is the racial 
and gender composition of the proposed patent juries.  Several scientific 
fields have stark racial or gender disparities,92 and one might expect these 
disparities to be reflected in specialized patent juries for those fields.  To 
combat these disparities, the government might aggressively recruit patent 
jurors from under-represented groups.  For example, since only 2.9% of life 
scientists are African-American,93 the government might aggressively 
recruit patent jurors from the life science programs at Historically Black 
Colleges and Universities (HBCU’s).  As another example, since only 
25.4% of computer and math scientists are women,94 the government might 
aggressively recruit patent jurors from the computer science and 
mathematics programs at all-female colleges.  Likewise, the government 
could target volunteer organizations — such as the National Society of 
Black Engineers95 and the Association for Women in Science96 — in an 
 92.   See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text (providing statistics regarding racial 
and gender composition of those in technical fields). 
 93.   See supra note 71 and accompanying text (providing statistics). 
 94.   See supra note 71 and accompanying text (providing statistics). 
 95.   The National Society of Black Engineers is an organization with roughly 30,000 
members whose mission is “to increase the number of culturally responsible Black 
engineers who excel academically, succeed professionally and positively impact the 
community.”  See About NSBE, NAT’L SOC’Y OF BLACK ENG’RS,
http://www.nsbe.org/About-Us.aspx#.VqgDwGr2Zdg [https://perma.cc/PPB2-TURF] (last 
visited Mar. 22, 2016) (providing information about the National Society of Black 
Engineers).
 96.   The Association for Women in Science is an organization with roughly 20,000 
members that “champions the interests of women in science, technology, engineering, and 
mathematics across all disciplines and employment sectors.”  See About AWIS, ASS’N FOR 
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effort to assemble patent jury pools that are more representative of the 
general population. 
It is even possible that specialized patent juries could help ameliorate
some of the racial and gender disparities that plague certain scientific 
industries.  Currently, there is evidence that hiring managers in STEM 
(science, technology, math, and engineering) fields are consciously or 
unconsciously biased against female job applicants.97  However, if the 
government successfully recruited a large cohort of female patent jurors, 
and if a one-year stint as a patent juror became a valuable credential in 
patent-heavy industries, then female patent jurors might use this credential 
to improve their job prospects in these industries.  A similar logic applies to 
under-represented racial groups, who may similarly face bias when 
applying for industry jobs in STEM fields.98
CONCLUSION
The current patent jury system is, if not broken, at least far from 
optimal.  Lay jurors are simply ill-suited to perform many of the complex 
tasks that are required in deciding high-tech patent cases.  But this state of 
affairs is not inevitable.  As this Article demonstrates, it would be feasible 
(and constitutional) for the government to assemble specialized patent 
juries comprised of individuals who are skilled in technical fields.  These 
specialized juries would bring much-needed scientific and technical 
expertise to the field of complex patent litigation. 
WOMEN IN SCI., http://www.awis.org/?page=AboutAWIS [https://perma.cc/42X5-VCL7] 
(last visited Mar. 22, 2016) (providing information about the Association for Women in 
Science).
 97.   See generally Ernest Reuben et al., How Stereotypes Impair Women’s Careers in 
Science, 111 PROC. OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI. 4403 (2014) (reporting results of 
experiment suggesting that hiring managers are biased toward hiring males). 
 98.   See Bonnie Marcus, The Lack of Diversity in Tech Is a Cultural Issue, FORBES
(Aug. 12, 2015) http://www.forbes.com/sites/bonniemarcus/2015/08/12/the-lack-of-
diversity-in-tech-is-a-cultural-issue/#160331523577 [https://perma.cc/42BU-C3X8] (noting 
that “top universities graduate black and Hispanic computer science and computer 
engineering students at twice the rate that leading technology companies hire them.”). 
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APPENDIX A: SURVEY METHODOLOGY
To conduct the survey discussed in this Article, I created an online 
survey form using Google Forms.  (See Appendix B).  I then emailed the 
department chairs (or other professors) in the computer science, electrical 
engineering, and biology departments at numerous U.S. colleges and 
universities, asking them to distribute the survey to undergraduate and 
graduate students in their departments.  Professors from sixteen colleges 
and universities agreed to distribute my survey. 
As shown in the sample survey form below (see Appendix B), the 
survey respondents were first asked to provide their undergraduate or 
graduate field of study.  Any respondents who did not affirmatively state 
that they were pursuing a degree in computer science, electrical 
engineering, or a life science were discarded.  Any respondents who gave 
internally contradictory answers (e.g., stating that they would not consider 
patent jury service in the second question but stating that they would 
consider patent jury service for $75,000 in the third question) were also 
discarded.  These discarded responses amounted to roughly 3% of total 
responses and are not included in my reported tally of responses. 
There was one exception to this rule.  Namely, if a respondent stated 
that they would not consider patent jury service in the second question, but 
also stated that they would consider patent jury service for more than 
$100,000 in the third question, I retained those responses.  Roughly 1% of 
respondents (5 out of 389) fell into this category.  Their responses are 
included in the “more than $100,000” bar of my bar graphs, though it 
would have been equally accurate to include them in the “not at all” bar.  
Including them in both bars, by contrast, would have resulted in double-
counting. 
My rationale for retaining these responses was as follows: for 
purposes of my proposal, respondents who would not consider patent jury 
service at all and respondents who would only consider patent jury service 
for more than $100,000 are functionally equivalent.  Both groups would be 
unwilling to serve as patent jurors under the terms of my proposal, given 
that my proposal entails a $100,000 salary for patent jurors.  Thus, for 
purposes of my proposal, answering “no” to the second question and “more 
than $100,000” to the third question is not actually contradictory since both
responses qualify the individual as someone who would be unwilling to 
serve as a juror under my proposal.  It follows that retaining these survey 
responses (and including them in either the “more than $100,000” category 
or the “not at all” category) does not skew my overall survey results.  In 
fact, discarding these responses would misleadingly skew my survey 
results by eliminating certain negative data that rightfully should be 
included.  
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APPENDIX B: SAMPLE SURVEY FORM
